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ESSAY
RECUSAL, GOVERNMENT ETHICS, AND SUPERANNUATED
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
KEITH SWISHER ∗
ABSTRACT
Something good and something bad happened recently in government and judicial ethics; for some reason, no one has truly noticed
yet. The Supreme Court all but banned First Amendment analysis
as applied to recusal laws, both legislative and judicial. That, actually, is the good thing, or so this Article argues. The bad thing is
that the Court, in doing so, used a geriatric approach to constitutional theory. The approach is unduly reverent of anything “old;”
and old is not limited to the practices of the Founding Fathers but
also includes “traditional” practices within some undefined range.
But what is old is not necessarily wise, and a theory to the contrary
leads to degenerative results in general and in ethics in particular,
or so this Article argues further. This Article concludes with a return to the positive, hoping that the Court’s path may have inadvertently sparked a viable conceptual foundation for judicial recusal
law and practice, which of course, have received much general press
and scholarly attention of late. That path is reconceptualizing the
nature of judicial action away from the judge as an individual and
toward the judge as a trustee.
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INTRODUCTION
A decade ago, the Supreme Court opened a can of worms in the
field of judicial ethics regulation. Some of the Justices did so intentionally, 1 other Justices did so mistakenly, 2 and other Justices resisted
futilely. 3 Whatever the intent, these worms have since been burrowing sizeable holes in the canons of judicial ethics.
The case was Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 4 and the can
of worms was, perhaps surprisingly, the First Amendment. Although

1. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 776, 788 (2002) (striking
down a Minnesota rule of judicial ethics barring judicial candidates from “announcing
their views on disputed legal or political issues” because the rule was not narrowly tailored
and therefore failed First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis); see also Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 766 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (striking down a rule of judicial ethics prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing their party affiliation).
2. Retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has since repudiated her vote in White (to no
legal effect, of course). See Matthew Hirsch, Swing Voter’s Lament: At Least One Case Still Bugs
O’Connor, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 9, 2006, at 2 (quoting Justice O’Connor stating that
the “White case, I confess, does give me pause”).
3. See White, 536 U.S. at 797, 817 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority opinion, which ignored the importance of judicial impartiality, would have
far-reaching effects).
4. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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the judicial ethics codes have been around for eighty-plus years, 5 they
have never enjoyed a comfortable working relationship with the First
Amendment. Indeed, whole canons are aimed—purposely—at suppressing judges’ speech and expressive conduct, and other canons are
aimed—again purposely—at forcing judges to recuse themselves from
certain cases on the basis of their speech and expressive conduct. 6
Although the tension between the canons and the First Amendment
has always been palpable, the canons—and more importantly, the judicial regulators charged with enforcing them—suffered very few First
Amendment losses until a decade ago. 7
White caused, or at least portended, a wave of constitutional litigation in both federal and state courts. To judicial ethics regulators
(and me) 8 that wave was scary and chilling, and in some ways, it still
5. See Eileen C. Gallagher, The ABA Revisits the Model Code of Judicial Conduct: A Report
on Progress, 44 JUDGES J. 7, 7 (2005) (noting that the ABA’s Canons of Judicial Ethics were
first adopted in 1924).
6. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, R. 2.10(A) (2007) (barring
judges from commenting on pending proceedings); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 3B(9) (2004) (same); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007) (barring even the “appearance of impropriety”); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
2A (2004) (same); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, R. 4.1 (2007) (barring
various interactions and affiliations with political organizations); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 5A(1) (2004) (same); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, R.
2.11(A)(5) (2007) (requiring recusal when “[t]he judge . . . has made a public statement,
other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that commits or appears to
commit the judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding
or controversy”); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1)(f) (2004) (requiring
recusal whenever “the judge, while a judge or a candidate for judicial office, has made a
public statement that commits, or appears to commit, the judge with respect to (i) an issue
in the proceeding; or (ii) the controversy in the proceeding”).
7. To be sure, the prominent Judge Posner struck a significant First Amendment blow
about a decade earlier. See Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228, 231 (7th
Cir. 1993) (striking down the “announce clause”). As Judge Posner necessarily conceded,
however, his only on-point authority was a Kentucky Supreme Court decision from two
years earlier, J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1991), and as he further conceded,
the Third Circuit had reached the opposite conclusion that same year in Stretton v. Disciplinary Board, 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
8. By way of background, the United States now has a generally strong system of judicial ethics regulation, in which judicial conduct commissions and state supreme courts
routinely discipline (for example, censure, suspend, or remove) judges for conduct that
violates the canons of judicial ethics. See Keith Swisher, The Judicial Ethics of Criminal Law
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is. 9 While weighing countervailing First Amendment interests, White
seemingly underweighs the ideal role of the judge in the American
system, 10 and it is symptomatic of judicial elections, which are problematic for reasons beyond this Essay’s scope. But two very recent Supreme Court cases have protected, and even exalted, the judicial ethics rules and statutes governing recusal. 11 As I argue in Parts I
through III, the end result is that White, when coupled with two very
recent cases in an unlikely trilogy, has ultimately and perhaps inadvertently brought a greater good to ethics in government: Recusal
laws are now clearly constitutional and enforceable. This result
should promote (among other good things) judicial impartiality and
integrity, which in turn protect litigants, the rule of law, and public
confidence in the judiciary.
But with good often comes bad: The Court’s reasoning—namely,
that age and tradition should play the primary roles in assessing the
permissibility of conduct—leads to arbitrary constitutional and ethical
theory, if it can be called theory at all. It is, in short, a blind reverence
to anything old, which is concerning for any primary theory of interpretation, but it is particularly concerning for ethics, as raised in Part
IV. Moreover, the Court’s approach is further diminished by a lack of
rigor in its historiography. 12 I end, however, on a positive upshot of
the Court’s historical approach: By taking away judges’ ownership and
standing over their judicial votes, the Court’s reasoning has suggested
Adjudication, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 755, 756–65 (2009) (discussing judicial conduct commissions,
the judicial ethics codes, and their significant influence in regulating judicial conduct).
9. See infra note 119 (noting the risk that future litigation might raise vagueness,
overbreadth, and associational rights challenges to the judicial ethics rules).
10. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 803–04 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Unlike their counterparts in the political branches, judges are expected to refrain from catering to particular constituencies or committing themselves on
controversial issues in advance of adversarial presentation. Their mission is to decide ‘individual cases and controversies’ on individual records, neutrally applying legal principles,
and, when necessary, ‘stand[ing] up to what is generally supreme in a democracy: the
popular will.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (1989))); see also id. at 813
(“This judicial obligation to avoid prejudgment corresponds to the litigant’s right, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to ‘an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.’” (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446
U.S. 238, 242 (1980))).
11. See infra Parts II–III.
12. See infra Part IV.A.
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a new conceptual foundation for judicial recusal, which badly needs
the boost of late. 13
I. CONUNDRUM: REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE
The modern story of the regulation of judges’ ethics in this country has much to do with a trilogy of cases. The first case in that trilogy
prominently pitted the First Amendment against judicial ethics, and
when the Supreme Court declared the First Amendment to be the
winner, 14 the judicial ethics regulations and regulators were cast into
doubt for a decade. 15
A candidate for the Minnesota Supreme Court, Greg Wersal,
wanted to campaign on what has become a typical conservative platform in judicial elections. In particular, he desired to criticize the
court publicly for its rulings on “crime, welfare, and abortion.” 16 As a

13. See infra Part IV.B (describing the conceptual shift toward “judges as trustees”).
Judicial ethics and particularly recusal have received much press of late, focusing on the
Supreme Court’s lack of a binding judicial ethics code, which embarrassingly distinguishes
it from virtually every other federal and state court in the country, and its questionable
recusal decisions. See, e.g., Editorial, The Supreme Court’s Recusal Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
2011, at A38. The buzz has been so loud that Chief Justice Roberts devoted his entire annual report to the matter. See CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON
THE

FEDERAL

JUDICIARY

(2011),

http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-

end/2011year-endreport.pdf (commenting on the call for and development of the ABA’s
first judicial ethics code); Adam Liptak, Chief Justice Defends Peers on Health Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2012, at A1 (relating the Chief Justice’s comments in his report to the debate on
whether Justices Thomas and Kagan should recuse themselves from the healthcare case).
In as many months, Chief Justice Roberts has twice rejected calls for reform. See Robert
Barnes, Roberts: Justices Won’t Adopt Code of Conduct, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2012, at A7 (citing
Chief Justice Roberts’s recent letter to senators, including the Chair of the Judiciary
Committee, in which the Chief Justice rejected their requests for the Court to adopt a
binding judicial ethics code).
14. White, 536 U.S. at 788.
15. See supra note 6 (providing a significant sampling of the various provisions of judicial ethics implicating the First Amendment); see also supra note 8 (noting the widespread
and well-rooted system of judicial ethics regulation in this country).
16. White, 536 U.S. at 768. The political (attitudinal) read of the case is that the Republican Justices invalidated a rule that blocked a Republican judicial candidate from announcing his conservative views during the judicial election. For this and other reasons,
judicial elections tend to be, on balance, more problematic than merit selection, but a direct attack on judicial elections is beyond this work’s scope. For more on the advantages
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candidate for judicial office, however, the canons of judicial ethics in
Minnesota (and in several other states at the time) prohibited him
from doing so. 17 In particular, the rules barred candidates (and incumbents) from announcing their views on “disputed legal and political issues.” 18 Fearing that he might be silenced or disciplined, or
both, Wersal brought suit claiming that this “announce clause” violated the First Amendment. 19
Applying demanding strict scrutiny analysis, the Court concluded
that the canon violated the First Amendment. 20 Although Justice
O’Connor has since renounced her vote in the case, 21 at the time she
perhaps framed the problem best: She acknowledged that “[e]lected
judges cannot help being aware that if the public is not satisfied with
the outcome of a particular case, it could hurt their reelection prospects” and their “rel[iance] on campaign donations may leave judges
feeling indebted to certain parties or interest groups.” 22 But, having
of the merit system, see Mark I. Harrison et al., On the Validity and Vitality of Arizona’s Judicial Merit Selection System: Past, Present, and Future, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 239, 250–59
(2007).
17. White, 536 U.S. at 770; see also J.J. GASS, AFTER WHITE: DEFENDING AND AMENDING
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS 2 (2004) (noting that eight states had some version of the
challenged “announce clause” when White was decided).
18. White, 536 U.S. at 768.
19. I have spared the reader White’s disorderly procedural posture. See id. at 768–70
(reviewing the procedural history of the case).
20. Id. at 774–75, 788; see also James Bopp, Jr. & Anita Y. Woudenberg, To Speak or Not to
Speak: Unconstitutional Regulation in the Wake of White, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 329, 330 (2007) (“In
particular, the Court, interpreting ‘impartiality’ to prevent ‘bias for or against parties’ and
possibly to preserve the ‘openmindedness’ of a judge, found that preventing judicial candidates from merely announcing their views on various legal, political, and social issues did
not address those concerns at all and, consequently, could not justify the restriction of an
express constitutional right to free speech.”).
21. See Hirsch, supra note 2, at 2 (revealing that Justice O’Connor has since reconsidered her vote in White).
22. White, 536 U.S. at 789–790 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 816 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (concluding that an elected judge has a “direct, personal, substantial, [and]
pecuniary interest in ruling against certain litigants for she may be voted off the bench and
thereby lose her salary and emoluments unless she honors the pledge that secured her
election.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted));
MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS § 9.08[3], at
248–50 (3d ed. 2004) (noting the important fact that Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor
were writing for five justices).
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chosen that questionable system, the state could not duct-tape judges’
mouths on the campaign trail:
Minnesota has chosen to select its judges through contested
popular elections instead of through an appointment system
or a combined appointment and retention election system
along the lines of the Missouri Plan. In doing so the State
has voluntarily taken on the risks to judicial bias . . . . As a
result, the State’s claim that it needs to significantly restrict
judges’ speech in order to protect judicial impartiality is particularly troubling. If the State has a problem with judicial
impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by
continuing the practice of popularly electing judges. 23
And Justice Scalia seized on the point:
‘[T]he greater power to dispense with elections altogether
does not include the lesser power to conduct elections under conditions of state-imposed voter ignorance. If the State
chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the
democratic process, it must accord the participants in that
process . . . the First Amendment rights that attach to their
roles.’ 24
Although White was laudable in some ways, 25 its crowning feature
was, regrettably, its corrosive effect on judicial ethics regulation. It

23. White, 536 U.S. at 792 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 788 (majority opinion) (alterations in original) (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501
U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
25. Although the litigation aftermath of (and some of the language in) White was highly problematic, the result was palatable. See, e.g., Keith A. Swisher, The Moral Judge, 56
DRAKE L. REV. 637, 670–71 (2008) (arguing that the White result was laudable insofar as it
lifted the flawed “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy in judicial regulation); see also Viet D. Dinh,
Threats to Judicial Independence, Real and Imagined, 95 GEO. L.J. 929, 937 (2007) (“It certainly
is proper for Senators to inquire about nominees’ general judicial philosophies and interpretive methodologies.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and
Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 977 n.45 (2007) (“Inquiries as to interpretive
methodology, though sometimes used as a proxy for substantive ideology, may pose fewer
risks of creating the appearance of seeking, or giving, ‘assurances’ or precommitments,
because its application may be uncertain in particular cases.”). Another salutary development following White was the ethical codification of open-mindedness. See White, 536 U.S.
at 775–78 (defining impartiality as “lack of bias for or against either party” or “as
openmindedness,” which “in a judge demands, not that he have no preconceptions on legal issues, but that he be willing to consider views that oppose his preconceptions, and re-

226

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:219

bogged down judicial regulators, who were already understaffed and
underfunded, in years of First Amendment litigation. Post-White and
pre-Caperton, 26 moreover, commentators were predicting and hastening an end to judicial campaign regulation, and regulators were
living in fear of the First Amendment. 27 The following is a telling
summary of the post-White, pre-Caperton picture:
The increasing and often successful attacks on [a] wide array
of canons have left state bodies charged with regulating judicial conduct in disarray, especially when applying canons
applicable to campaign conduct. As one trial court observed: “To say that there is considerable uncertainty regarding the scope of the Supreme Court’s decision in White is an
understatement . . . .” 28
main open to persuasion, when the issues arise in a pending case”). Impartiality is now
defined as the “absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or
classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues that may
come before a judge.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (2007); see also
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (2004) (using substantively identical
language).
26. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); see also infra Part II (discussing Caperton’s impact).
27. See, e.g., Steven Lubet, Judicial Campaign Speech and the Third Law of Motion, 22
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 425, 426 (2008) (forecasting that bans on extrajudicial speech may be doomed by expanding First Amendment doctrine); Bopp &
Woudenberg, supra note 20 at 332–33 (concluding that disciplining judges for failing to
recuse themselves would be unconstitutional to the extent it “chill[s]” campaign speech
protected by the First Amendment).
28. Deborah Goldberg, James Sample & David E. Pozen, The Best Defense: Why Elected
Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 508 (2007) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting in part N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp.
2d 1021, 1041 (D.N.D. 2005)); see also id. at 515 (arguing that, although some recent scandals have driven recusal reform, “it is the White ruling more than any other development
that now has the potential to alter the nature and practice of judicial disqualification”);
David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 297–98 (2008) (noting the many post-White challenges to various canons). Indeed, for years now, the American Judicature Society has maintained a running study of White consequences. See Am. Judicature Soc’y, Case-law Following Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765
(2002), 1 (last visited July 9, 2012), http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs/CaselawafterWhite.pdf
(tracking cases that have “challeng[ed] restrictions on campaign and political conduct by
judges and judicial candidates”); Cynthia Gray, Am. Judicature Soc’y, Developments Following
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (last visited July 9, 2012),
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Perhaps even more disturbingly, however, some courts and
commentators persuasively argued that if a judge had a right to announce a certain view, such as “tough on crime,” she should not face
a corresponding duty to recuse herself for exercising her right. 29
Caperton, however, brought imperfect relief, through a case in which
“bad” facts finally made some good law. 30
II. COUNTERWEIGHT: CAPERTON V. A.T. MASSEY COAL
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. is the second case in our constitutional ethics trilogy. 31 It is a “pathbreaking” and “momentous” Su-

http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs/DevelopmentsafterWhite.pdf (tracking developments, on
both the state and federal levels, following from the White decision). Similarly, the Brennan Center for Justice provides another tally. See Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y.U. Sch. L.,
Summaries of Relevant Cases Decided Since Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/summaries_of_relevant_cases_decided
_since_republican_party_of_minnesota_v_w (last visited July 9, 2012) (summarizing cases
decided after White).
29. See, e.g., Bopp & Woudenberg, supra note 20, at 332–33 (concluding that disciplining judges for failing to recuse themselves would be unconstitutional to the extent it
“chill[s]” campaign speech protected by the First Amendment). To be sure, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence nodded approvingly to stricter recusal provisions, White, 536 U.S. at
794 (Kennedy, J., concurring), but the majority’s holding strongly suggested to the contrary.
30. Chief Justice Roberts reached the opposite conclusion, claiming that the majority’s
opinion exemplified the “legal aphorism: ‘Hard cases make bad law.’” Caperton, 556 U.S.
at 899 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). His conclusion hardly follows: “Few situations more severely threaten trust in the judicial process than the perception that a litigant never had a
chance because the decisionmaker may have owed the other side special favors.” Martin
H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due
Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 483 (1986).
31. Caperton has quickly generated a strong literature. See Comment, Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co.: Due Process Limitations on the Appearance of Judicial Bias, 123 HARV. L. REV.
73 (2009) (discussing the case and the Court’s reasoning); Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges,
Judging Elections, and the Lessons of Caperton, 123 HARV. L. REV. 80 (2009) (discussing Caperton’s contribution to discussions on judicial elections and “judicial regulation of politics”);
Lawrence Lessig, What Everybody Knows and What Too Few Accept, 123 HARV. L. REV. 104
(2009) (addressing the issues of independence and improper dependence concerning
campaign contributions); Penny J. White, Relinquished Responsibilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 120
(2009) (discussing the opinions in Caperton in conjunction with the Due Process Clause
concerns raised by judicial elections). For an excellent symposium on the issue, see Sym-
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preme Court decision from 2009. 32 Caperton, to be sure, said nothing
about the First Amendment—it never even uttered those words. The
case was instead about due process: In particular, the Court grappled
with the extent to which money (both independent expenditures and
campaign contributions) spent assisting a judge’s election created an
intolerable risk of bias in that judge. The petitioner’s question to the
Court concisely framed the issue:
[Acting Chief] Justice Brent Benjamin of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia refused to recuse himself
from the appeal of the $50 million jury verdict in this case,
even though the CEO of the lead defendant[, Don Blankenship,] spent $3 million supporting his campaign for a seat
on the court—more than 60% of the total amount spent to
support Justice Benjamin’s campaign—while preparing to
[ ]
appeal the verdict against his company. 33 After winning
election to the court, Justice Benjamin cast the deciding vote
in the court’s 3-2 decision overturning that verdict. The
posium, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215 (2010). For my own take
on the case, from which I have liberally borrowed for this short Part, see Keith Swisher, ProProsecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy, Ripe for Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV.
317, 339–51 (2010) [hereinafter Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges].
32. See James J. Sample, Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 293, 298 (2010) [hereinafter Sample, Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow] (noting that
Caperton is “a pathbreaking decision of momentous import for the future of judicial elections and disputes over judicial bias” (internal quotations marks omitted)); Caperton, 556
U.S. at 872 (holding that due process requires state court judges to recuse themselves from
cases in which parties have directly contributed, or independently expended, large sums of
money in support of the judges’ election).
33. The three million-plus that Blankenship spent on the campaign was itemized as
follows:
In addition to contributing the $1,000 statutory maximum to Benjamin’s campaign committee, Blankenship donated almost $2.5 million to “And For The Sake Of The Kids,” a political organization formed under 26 U.S.C. § 527. . . .
Blankenship’s donations accounted for more than two-thirds of the total funds it
raised. . . . Blankenship spent, in addition, just over $500,000 on independent
expenditures—for direct mailings and letters soliciting donations as well as television and newspaper advertisements—“to support . . . Brent Benjamin.”
Id. at 873 (third alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Blankenship’s state
campaign financial disclosure filings); see also DonLBlankenship, YOUTUBE (Sept. 8, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/user/DonLBlankenship#p/u (providing access to the television
advertisements Blankenship funded during the election).
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question presented is whether Justice Benjamin’s failure to
recuse himself from participation in his principal financial
supporter’s case violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 34
The Supreme Court voted five to four that Benjamin’s failure to
recuse himself violated the Due Process Clause. 35 Justice Kennedy authored the opinion, concluding that Benjamin harbored a “serious,”
“objective” “probability of bias” when he refused to recuse himself in a
case involving his biggest supporter from his previous—and perhaps
future—election. 36
As suggested at the outset, the case was noticeably imperfect in
that it never even mentioned the First Amendment. 37 Caperton was
and is relevant, however, because it treated recusal rules with unmatched reverence. States were not only free, but encouraged, to
craft recusal rules stronger than the due process floor (that is, the relatively low point at which a judge’s “probability” of bias becomes constitutionally intolerable). 38 The Court, furthermore, explicitly blessed
34. Brief for Petitioners at i, Caperton, 556 U.S. 868 (No. 08-22), 2008 WL 5433361, at
*i.
35. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 871–72.
36. Id at 872, 884, 886. In its narrow form, the Court’s holding was “that Blankenship’s
significant and disproportionate influence—coupled with the temporal relationship between the election and the pending case—offer a possible temptation to the average . . .
judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.” Id. at 886 (alterations
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Stated slightly differently, there was “a
serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions—when a person
with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence
in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.” Id. at 884; see also Keith Swisher, Legal Ethics and Campaign Contributions: The Professional Responsibility to Pay for Justice, 24 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 225 (2011) (providing context for measuring influence and bias).
37. Although the Court itself never mentioned the First Amendment, both the Court
and the parties in their briefs cited the White opinion. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889; see also,
e.g., Brief for Petitioners, supra note 34, at v (indicating locations of citations to White within the brief).
38. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889 (“States may choose to adopt recusal standards more
rigorous than due process requires.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at
889–90 (reiterating that “states, of course, remain free to impose more rigorous standards
for judicial disqualification than those we find mandated here today” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Sample, Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, supra note 32, at 303–04 (observing that Caperton “provides real momentum for state-based recusal reform efforts”).
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“the judicial reforms the States have implemented to eliminate even
the appearance of partiality.” 39 Moreover, even without an explicit
First Amendment reference, the context—in which a citizen had supported one justice and opposed another through independent expenditures—spoke loudly. 40 Thus, under current First Amendment doctrine, the supporter had clearly exercised First Amendment-protected
freedoms to speak in a sense. 41 To be sure, the Justice’s speech was
not in issue, but regulating matters of speech and money concerning
an elected judge or his supporter necessarily risks affecting the judge
at the polls or in his conduct. Yet, recusal law and the Due Process
Clause carried the day. 42
In sum, Caperton swung the pendulum away from the First
Amendment, but regulators would have to wait until the third and final case of this ethics trilogy before the Court again directly addressed
the looming First Amendment.
III. CLOSURE: NEVADA COMMISSION ON ETHICS v. CARRIGAN
Almost exactly two years later, the Supreme Court has now, arguably, closed the can of worms. In Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan, 43 the Supreme Court upheld Nevada’s Ethics in Government
Law, which requires (in short) that public officials refrain from voting
on matters in which they have personal interests. 44 In Carrigan, a city

Even Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, explicitly agreed: “States are, of course, free to
adopt broader recusal rules than the Constitution requires—and every State has—but
these developments are not continuously incorporated into the Due Process Clause.”
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 893 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
39. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 888 (majority opinion).
40. Id. at 873.
41. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) (reasoning that limits on campaign
expenditures are limits on protected political speech).
42. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010) (discussing Caperton and noting that “[t]he remedy of recusal was based on a litigant’s due process right to a fair trial
before an unbiased judge. Caperton’s holding was limited to the rule that the judge must
be recused, not that the litigant’s political speech could be banned.” (citation omitted)).
In light of the influence and timing of the expenditures, moreover, the Caperton opinion
contained this theme: “Just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar
fears of bias can arise when—without the consent of the other parties—a man chooses the
judge in his own cause.” Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886. I return briefly to this theme in Part IV.
43. 131 S. Ct. 2343 (2011).
44. Id. at 2346–47.
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council member voted to approve a casino even though his campaign
manager and close friend had a financial interest in the casino’s development. 45 The Nevada Ethics Commission censured the council
member for his actions, and in response he brought a First Amendment challenge, claiming in part that his vote constituted protected
speech. 46 Rejecting the challenge, the Court found (again in short)
that recusal rules in these circumstances do not, and did not ever, violate the First Amendment. 47 The Court was unanimous as to the result—and nearly so as to the reasoning. 48 And bringing our trilogy of
Supreme Court cases full circle, the first case that the Carrigan Court
cited on the merits was, surprisingly, White. 49
A narrow reading of the Carrigan opinion is simply this: Even if
legislators intend to express deeply held beliefs through their votes,
the “act of voting [i]s still nonsymbolic conduct engaged in for an independent governmental purpose.” 50 In other words, “a legislator has
no right to use official powers for expressive purposes.” 51 But the narrow holding is only half the point: The Court unanimously justified
this holding by using the historical strength of recusal laws, both legislative and judicial. 52 Immediately below, I explain why Carrigan is
generally outstanding for judicial recusal law, although it rests on

45. Id.
46. Id. at 2347.
47. Id. at 2350–51. A contrary holding would have, once again, struck First Amendment fear in the hearts of judicial ethics regulators. Cf. Brief for Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of the Press et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13–14, Carrigan, 131
S. Ct. 2343 (No. 10-568), 2011 WL 882593, at *13–14 (worrying that several canons of judicial ethics could be put into constitutional jeopardy if the Court applied First Amendment
strict scrutiny analysis to Nevada’s recusal scheme).
48. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2346 (majority opinion); id. at 2352 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2354 (Alito, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 2348 (majority opinion).
50. Id. at 2350–51.
51. Id. at 2351.
52. See id. at 2347–49 (noting the “long-established tradition” of judicial and legislative
recusal statutes); see also id. at 2352 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joining the Court’s opinion
but writing separately to express reservations about possible infringement of associational
rights by legislative, but not judicial, recusal law); id. at 2355 (Alito, J., concurring) (concluding that legislative voting is indeed expressive conduct, but nevertheless concurring
because “recusal rules were not regarded during the founding era as impermissible restrictions on freedom of speech”).
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shaky analytical ground. I then unearth a few ways in which the case
and its theories present both concern and promise for the future.
IV. CONGRATULATIONS, CONCERN, AND CONVALESCENCE
The majority and two concurring opinions in Carrigan are relevant and indeed crucial to judicial ethics for at least four reasons: (1)
the essentially unanimous opinion of the Court strongly validates the
historical pedigree and constitutional legitimacy of American recusal
laws, both legislative and judicial; 53 (2) both Justice Scalia (for the
opinion of the Court) and Justice Kennedy (for his own pivotal self)
suggest that recusal rules may, understandably, be crafted more rigidly
for the judiciary than for the legislature; 54 (3) the Court draws an im-

53. In support of federal judicial recusal laws, the Court listed the following evidence:
Federal conflict-of-interest rules applicable to judges also date back to the
founding. In 1792, Congress passed a law requiring district court judges to recuse themselves if they had a personal interest in a suit or had been counsel to a
party appearing before them.

In 1821, Congress expanded these bases for

recusal to include situations in which “the judge . . . is so related to, or connected with, either party, as to render it improper for him, in his opinion, to sit on
the trial of such suit.” The statute was again expanded in 1911, to make any
“personal bias or prejudice” a basis for recusal. The current version, which retains much of the 1911 version’s language, is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 144.
Id. at 2348–49 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). The Court listed the state evidence
as follows:
A number of States enacted early judicial recusal laws as well. See, e.g., 1797
Vt. Laws, § 23, p. 178 (“[N]o justice of the peace shall take cognizance of any
cause, where he shall be within either the first, second, third, or fourth degree of
affinity, or consanguinity, to either of the parties, or shall be directly or indirectly
interested, in the cause or matter to be determined”); 1818 Mass. Laws, § 5, p.
632 (“[W]henever any Judge of Probate shall be interested in the estate of any
person deceased, within the county of such Judge, such estate shall be settled in
the Probate Court of the most ancient next adjoining county . . .”); Macon v.
Huff, 60 Ga. 221, 223–226 (1878).
Id. at 2349 n.4 (alterations in original).
54. As Justice Scalia noted in the Court’s opinion, “[t]here are of course differences
between a legislator’s vote and a judge’s, and thus between legislative and judicial recusal
rules; nevertheless, there do not appear to have been any serious challenges to judicial
recusal statutes as having unconstitutionally restricted judges’ First Amendment rights.”
Id. at 2349 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 2349 n.3 (distinguishing White). Justice Kennedy somewhat similarly noted in his concurrence:
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portant First Amendment distinction between campaign conduct and
official conduct (such as a failure to recuse from voting); 55 and (4)
the majority opinion provides a way to conceptualize judges’ votes
that may pay future dividends toward reconciling and crafting recusal
law. 56 Carrigan thus presents remarkable promise for ushering in a
new era of solidarity and hope in recusal law. The capstone of this
constitutional trilogy therefore deserves congratulations to that extent, and it is congratulations that no court or commentator has yet
granted the opinion.
Carrigan and its reasoning, however, typify a growing problem in
constitutional theory, and this problem is amplified when applied to
legal and judicial ethics. Before I look further to the opinion’s promise, I address its Trojan-horse-like problems in the next Section.
A. Concern: Gerontology and Ethics
Among many other famous remarks, Justice Holmes captured
our realist hearts by noting that “[i]t is revolting to have no better
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV.” 57 Moving from realist to critical, though, our cherished
principles—including the First Amendment, “fundamental rights,”
and due process—-can be corrupted into historical relics and thereby

The Court has held that due process may require recusal in the context of
certain judicial determinations, see Caperton . . . . The differences between the
role of political bodies in formulating and enforcing public policy, on the one
hand, and the role of courts in adjudicating individual disputes according to law,
on the other, may call for a different understanding of the responsibilities attendant upon holders of those respective offices and of the legitimate restrictions that may be imposed upon them.
Id. at 2353 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
55. See id. at 2349 n.3 (majority opinion) (distinguishing White because it dealt with
campaign-trail conduct, not acts or omissions in office).
56. See infra Part IV.B; see also Posting of Keith Swisher to The Judicial Ethics Forum, A
Supreme Victory for Government Ethics and Judicial Recusal (June 14, 2011),
http://judicialethicsforum.com/2011/06/14/a-supreme-victory-for-government-ethicsand-judicial-recusal/.
57. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., Address at the
Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston University School of Law: The Path of the Law
(Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897); see also id. (noting further that “[i]t is
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past”).
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become deserving of Holmes’s criticism.58 Although Carrigan has
much to commend it, it is also a pointed example of problematic constitutional theory that transcends far beyond one case. It is a theory
of keeping law old and outdated, and the theory is further complicated by the Court’s sloppy application. Both the methodology and the
merit of the Court’s theory are addressed below.
1. Historiographical Analysis: Older Is Looser
The Court’s methodology in historical inquiry employs essentially
four factors designed to determine whether any given practice 59
should survive constitutional scrutiny. In order of seeming importance to the Court, the four factors follow: (1) contemporaneity; 60
(2) longevity; 61 (3) uniformity; 62 and (4) dormancy. 63 Below, I analyze

58. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) (explaining that in
due process cases, courts “begin . . . by examining our Nation’s history, legal traditions,
and practices” and concluding that banning all physician-assisted suicide of competent,
terminally ill patients does not violate a fundamental right). Professor Erwin Chemerinsky
notes:
These examples [of Supreme Court decisions]—drawn from substantive due
process, criminal procedure provisions such as the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, and the First Amendment—are simply representative illustrations of a
much larger body of cases. Common to these cases is the Supreme Court’s use
of history and tradition to reject claims of individual rights. The Court openly
declares that the scope of constitutional rights is limited to that which has been
historically protected.
Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the First Amendment, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 901, 907 (1993).
59. By practice, I mean any conduct under examination as to whether it is or was legally permissible or impermissible (for example, whether judges must recuse themselves from
cases in which their spouses have a financial interest in the outcome; or whether certain
groups may vote in an election).
60. To determine contemporaneity, the Court measures the temporal distance between the beginning of the practice under scrutiny and the Constitution’s drafting (and if
applicable, the amendment’s ratification).
61. Here the Court looks for the length of time that the practice (or ban) has endured
in this country. For lengthy practices, the Court calls them “tradition.” See, e.g., Nev.
Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347–48 (2011). It is important to note
that a lengthy practice (since 1924) might have started many years after the Constitution
or the relevant amendment. It thus occupies a decidedly distinct axis than contemporaneity occupies, although the Carrigan Court conflated the two factors. See, e.g., id. (demon-
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problems of rigor in the application of each of these four related factors.
Carrigan quintessentially illustrates the Court’s lack of methodological rigor. 64 The Court ran together the first two factors, namely,
contemporaneity and longevity, to which we now turn. By contemporaneity, I mean that the Court measures the temporal distance between the beginning of the practice under scrutiny and the Constitution’s drafting (and if applicable, the amendment’s ratification):
shorter is better. By longevity, I mean that the Court measures the
length of time that the practice has endured in this country: longer is
better. When considering the practice of recusal regulation, the
Court was enamored with the early congressional enactments of both
legislative and judicial recusal rules. 65 “That evidence is dispositive
here” of the constitutional question. 66

strating a “long-established tradition of prohibiting certain conduct” by referring to
“[e]arly congressional enactments”).
62. That is, whether all, most, or at least many of the states have adopted the practice
under scrutiny. A critical mass of states following a contrary practice obviously would destroy or at least diminish uniformity.
63. Dormancy means that the practice has gone (largely) unchallenged.
64. Of course, this is not the first (or last) objection to the Court’s methodology in
studying and using history. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 526 (1995) (“[H]abits of poorly supported generalization—which at times fall below even the standards of undergraduate history writing—pervade the work of many of the most rigorous theorists when they invoke the past to
talk about the Constitution.”); Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court’s Uses of History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809, 826, 883–84 (1997) (“[T]he Court continues
to . . . ask questions of the past that the past cannot answer.”); Lucian E. Dervan, Comment, Selective Conceptions of Federalism: The Selective Use of History in the Supreme Court’s States’
Rights Opinions, 50 EMORY L.J. 1295, 1321–28 (2001) (outlining the Court’s reliance on
selective history). Historian Alfred Kelly provided the prime critique. See Alfred H. Kelly,
Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 157 (calling the “present use
of history by the Court . . . a Marxist-type perversion of the relation between truth and utility”); see also id. at 122 (defining the Court’s “‘law-office’ history” as “the selection of data
favorable to the position being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory
data or proper evaluation of the relevance of the data proffered”).
65. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2348 (“[E]arly congressional enactments ‘provid[e] contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the Constitution’s meaning.’” (alterations in original)
(quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997))).
66. Id. (emphasis added).
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Although the Court’s conclusion is a strong win for recusal, it is
nevertheless concerning for the future—in part because the Court
appears to follow few rules to ensure rigor in its measurements. Interestingly, for example, this “dispositive” evidence included a fifteenyear gap from the nation’s founding to the adoption of the Senate
recusal rules. 67 The Court correctly noted that the House adopted a
recusal rule in 1789. 68 In its next breath, however, the Court passingly
noted that the “first Senate rules did not include a recusal requirement,” and when the subject was finally addressed fifteen years later,
the resulting recusal rule was not adopted by the full Senate, but only
by its President (who, granted, was Thomas Jefferson). 69 The Court
immediately likened this “dispositive” history to that of federal judicial
recusal laws (and later, state judicial recusal laws). 70
Interestingly again, although the Court began with federal judicial recusal evidence from 1792, it then cited evidence from 1821 and
even 1911. 71 Surely, the Court cannot mean that congressional acts in
1911 are also “contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the Constitution’s [original] meaning;” 72 it must instead mean that a centennial
of practice is old and therefore wise. For Justice Scalia in particular, a
hundred-years-old practice is more than old enough. 73 Similarly, for
67. Id.
68. Id. (“No member shall vote on any question, in the event of which he is immediately and particularly interested.” (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 99 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed.,
1834))).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2348–49.
71. Id. It is important to note that, although these recusal citations were amendments
to what generally is the same recusal statute (currently, 28 U.S.C. § 455), each amendment
significantly broadened the statute’s scope by adding new bases for judicial disqualification, as the Court acknowledged. Id. Thus, we are not dealing with merely technical
changes to a statute that has remained substantively the same throughout the country’s
history.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 375–77 (1995) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (finding eighty-year ban persuasive of constitutional meaning). But older is
even better. See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2832–34, 2836 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(referring to the tests for acceptance as (1) “a long history of practice,” (2) “regulation
that had been widely used by the States since the end of the 19th Century,” (3) “governmental practice that has become general throughout the United States, and particularly
one that has the validation of long, accepted usage,” or (4) “longstanding and unquestioned,” but concluding that a practice first instituted in the states “in 1888, and almost 90
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the historical evidence of state judicial recusal laws, the Court cited
laws from three, far-from-tightly-grouped years: 1797, 1818, and
1878. 74
This lack of rigor in establishing relevant years, temporal distances, or requisite longevity presents aggravated problems for the future of judicial ethics regulation of elective judiciaries. Judicial elections were virtually nonexistent at the time of the founding; they bebegan to appear in the first quarter of the 1800s, with significant
growth in the mid-1800s. 75 Because the Court has applied a lack of
rigor in analyzing the relevant dates or date-ranges, we have little idea
what this complex history will mean for related judicial ethics regulation.
Even if the Court would articulate a time window of relevance
(which it has to date failed to do), an additional concern is the broad
and narrow framing of the practices under scrutiny. In Carrigan, the
Court went with broad framing, that is, lumping all recusal laws together and then checking whether recusal laws were on the books
near the founding (and fortunately some were). 76 The question is
whether future cases will frame the question more narrowly by, for
percent of the States had followed . . . by 1896” was nevertheless insufficient in light of earlier, contrary practice at the founding and the fact that apparently no one had explicitly
raised First Amendment concerns with the earlier practice); cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 399, 428 (1989) (striking down an anti-flag-burning law on First Amendment
grounds; although forty-eight states prohibited such conduct, they had done so only since
approximately 1917).
74. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2349 n.4; see generally John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges,
56 YALE L.J. 605, 612–26 (1947) (citing several state examples from the mid to late 1800s).
To be sure, the Court also drew example from a 1878 state case, City of Macon v. Huff, 60
Ga. 221 (1878). That case does not involve legislative or judicial recusal but rather a mildly analogous situation in which the mayor had entered into a personal contract with the
city council. Huff, 60 Ga. at 223–24. The case does cite, however, a state judicial recusal
statute from 1801 prohibiting judicial officers from sitting in cases in which they were “pecuniarily interested,” former counsel, or related to a party, an 1850 statute prohibiting
sheriffs and similar officers from purchasing at sheriff’s sales, and an 1872 statute (later
declared unconstitutional on other grounds) prohibiting municipal officers for contracting with the corporation for treasury payments. Id. at 225–28.
75. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 785–86 (2002) (describing
the history of judicial elections); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise
of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1093–1115 (2010) (chronicling the move to judicial elections from 1846 to 1851).
76. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2348–49, 2349 n.4 (2011).
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example, asking whether a particular type of recusal law is the right
amount of “old.” Narrowly framing the question would not be novel;
White followed it. 77 Indeed, the Court even has a name for this (or
something like this) approach—the most “specific level” of abstraction. 78
Turning to the third factor, and moving a bit away from the old,
the Court also asks whether the practice was uniform. But uniformity
necessarily means that it was popular with the controlling majorities
in most or all states. 79 Bowing to majorities’ preferences, however, is
deeply adverse to the judiciary’s purpose. 80 Furthermore, the Court
gives no test for discerning the requisite amount of uniformity. It is
77. White, 536 U.S. at 785 (analyzing the relatively narrow “practice of prohibiting
speech by judicial candidates on disputed issues” and finding that practice “neither long
nor universal”). Judicial ethics, of course, regulates judges’ speech in many other ways,
both on and off the campaign trail; the White Court discussed none of them.
78. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127–28 n.6 (1989) (“We refer to the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.”). Not all justices wholly accept this formulation, however. See
id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (refusing to join the footnote because “[o]n occasion the Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of
generality that might not be the most specific level available” and wishing not to “foreclose
the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of historical analysis”) (citations omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted).
79. To be sure, the diversity of the states gives us some assurance that certain practices
would not be uniform across the states. Similarly, if the Court required strict uniformity
(perhaps unanimity) it would provide some assurance that controversial practices would
fail this factor.
80. See, for example, Raines v. Byrd, in which the Court stated:
`“The irreplaceable value of the power articulated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall [in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803),] lies in the protection it has afforded the constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens
and minority groups against oppressive or discriminatory government action. It
is this role, not some amorphous general supervision of the operations of government, that has maintained public esteem for the federal courts and has permitted the peaceful coexistence of the countermajoritarian implications of judicial review and the democratic principles upon which our Federal Government
in the final analysis rests.”
521 U.S. 811, 828–29 (1997) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring)); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)
(noting the need for judicial independence to protect the minority against majority overreaching).
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entirely unanswered whether that amount means all states, all states
having legislated on the practice, a super-majority of states, or a majority of states, as examples. Indeed, what little is in the Carrigan and
other opinions suggests that a “uniform” practice might even consist
of something less than a majority of states. 81
With respect to the fourth factor, finally, the Court tells us that
dormancy is good; in other words, if no one has raised a “serious challenge” for (some unknown number of) years, the practice is constitutional and indeed a candidate for fundamental liberty. In Carrigan,
just for example, the Court observed that “there do not appear to
have been any serious challenges to judicial recusal statutes as having
unconstitutionally restricted judges’ First Amendment rights.” 82 Even
ignoring the Court’s surprisingly sloppy use of nineteenth century
state practices (before the First Amendment was even incorporated
against the states) to prove First Amendment consistency, 83 this factor
suggests another serious caution. The Court did not grapple with the
meaning of either “serious” or “challenges.” 84 Nor did it grapple with

81. See Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2349 & n.4 (citing “a number of states” for two propositions: (1) “States, by common-law rule, have long required recusal of public officials with a
conflict;” and (2) “States enacted early judicial recusal laws as well”). For each proposition, the Court cites only three states as examples. Id. In another example, however, the
Court observed that “90 percent” of the states prohibited a certain practice for nearly 100
years and reasoned that “this widespread and time-tested consensus” should guide its First
Amendment analysis. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 205–06 (1992).
82. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2349; see also id. at 2349 n.3 (distinguishing White because
that case involved a candidate’s campaign speech for judicial election).
83. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating First Amendment rights
to apply to the states). I thank Michael O’Connor for noting the timing issue.
84. For example, whether one challenge would be sufficient; whether that challenge
needs to raise the First Amendment (or whether another constitutional question would
suffice); and whether the challenge needs to have been lodged in a judicial forum (as opposed to, say, Congress or a newspaper). Apparently in Carrigan, however, each of these
questions would have been answered in the negative: “The Nevada Supreme Court and
Carrigan have not cited a single decision invalidating a generally applicable conflict-ofinterest recusal rule—and such rules have been commonplace for over 200 years.” 131 S.
Ct. at 2348. The Court, however, never clarified what it meant by a “generally applicable”
recusal rule, and what, if any, non-“generally applicable” recusal rules it meant to distinguish.
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more mundane questions, such as why seemingly irrelevant publication factors should impact constitutional interpretation. 85
The Court thus provides no indication of the requisite timing,
frequency, and venue of any “serious challenges” to the practice. This
dormancy requirement—depending on what it actually endeavors to
include—is again troubling for the judiciary. The politically and fiscally powerless (or underpowered) are less likely to have been in a position to challenge a practice. 86 When they finally have an opportunity to challenge it, they should not be turned away because they lacked
power to bring several challenges in several places over several years.
In sum, each criterion is problematic for the judiciary to employ,
and the primary criteria (age and tradition) are particularly degenerative for ethical decisions.
2. Superannuated Constitutional Theory: Older Is Older
The most striking characteristic of the four factors is not their
methodological indeterminacy but their geriatric emphasis: the older,
the better. This old-is-better bias, however, seems to be particularly
problematic for ethical inquiries: the values of men in 1787 through

85. For example, whether a court’s decision to publish an opinion should be consequential at all to the interpretation of a constitutional provision, and whether the decision
of a private publisher, such as West, impacting if and when certain court orders and opinions are published should also be consequential to the interpretation of a constitutional
provision. The upside, of course, is administrability: with the advent of electronic legal
databases, the inquiry into published challenges is relatively easy and the result is relatively
provable.
86. Justices Stevens and Breyer raised similar concerns about political powerlessness in
Raines. Justice Stevens stated:
The majority’s reference to the absence of any similar suit in earlier disputes . . . does not strike me as particularly relevant. First, the fact that others
did not choose to bring suit does not necessarily mean the Constitution would
have precluded them from doing so. Second, because Congress did not authorize declaratory judgment actions until the federal Declaratory Judgment Act of
1934, the fact that President Johnson did not bring such an action in 1868 is not
entirely surprising.
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 838 n.3 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Justice Breyer questioned reliance on “lawsuits that were not brought.” Id. at 843 (Breyer,
J., dissenting); see also Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–104 (1974) (discussing systemic distortion of legal rules by repeat, and often wealthy, players).
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1791 are, at best, underrepresentative of our pluralist society and, at
worst, patently offensive. 87 Similarly, values in the nineteenth and
even early twentieth centuries are often underdeveloped by today’s
standards. Professional ethics codes, likewise, were in a primitive
(and to a significant extent, nonexistent) state. Codified judicial ethics, in particular, had not yet even been born, and it would not be until significantly into the twentieth century before the ethics codes took
firm root across the country. 88 Thus, our personal and professional
ethics have evolved substantially in more recent times, 89 and it reverses our ethical development to take an overly geriatric approach to
these questions.
The “dispositive” historical analysis provokes another concern.
In Carrigan, unlike White, history was on recusal’s side. That is, recusal
rules have been on the books—and largely unchallenged—since
(close to) the founding. The same could not be said of the judicial
campaign speech rules in White. 90 Those particular rules were of relatively recent vintage, and the states had not uniformly adopted those
rules in any event. “The practice of prohibiting speech by judicial
87. We stand for diversity both in values and in people in ways wholly unappreciated at
the time of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers,
Justice, and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. REV. 389, 394–402 (2005) (discussing the values of moral pluralism); cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (referring to diversity as a compelling interest).
88. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal
Ethics-I. Origins, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 469, 471–72, 479–80 (2001).
89. See, for example, Lawrence v. Texas, which stated:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in
its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and
later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact
serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation
can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.
539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002)
(“‘The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. . . . The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958))).
90. Indeed, the Carrigan Court’s first substantive citation was to White—a belated and
surprising ally to recusal law. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2348
(2011).
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candidates on disputed issues . . . is neither long nor universal,” at
least according to Justice Scalia and four other Justices. 91 It is, therefore, fundamentally unsettling to note that it was not until 1924 that
the ABA produced the Canons of Judicial Ethics. 92
The divergent results above, then, owe mostly to history, not merit. Good governance might well mean that judges should refrain from
announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues, and perhaps because of this reason or another, recusal laws are unnecessary
or even untoward. Perhaps, for example, recusal laws—by encouraging judges to run from, rather than deal professionally with, their biases—might fail to promote the type of inner strength that good
judges should possess and exercise. 93 But such appeals to consequences or principles are largely irrelevant. Instead, we look primarily to whether the law is old—and the older the better. 94
The Carrigan reasoning is indeed justified on public confidence
grounds (that is, without recusal law and regulation, litigants and observers would not believe that a judge will maintain independence,
impartiality, and integrity in a case involving a personal conflict), 95
due process grounds (that is, the judge’s significant personal conflict
91. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 766, 785 (2002). Again, Justice
Scalia’s meaning of “long” seems to vary. See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit
Love Affair, 1965 S. CT. REV. 119, 156 (noting that judges’ training and experience do not
produce professional historians).
92. See generally JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS (4th ed. 2007)
(providing background on judicial conduct statutes and rules); ROBERTS, C.J., supra note
13, at 1–2 (commenting on the call for and development of the ABA’s first judicial ethics
code). The Canons served as the blueprint for judicial ethics codes across the country. Id.
at 2.
93. See, e.g., Sarah M.R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2007)
(proposing a significant curtailment of recusals and a requirement that judges provide
thorough explanations of their decisions to bolster their legitimacy).
94. Justice Alito’s analysis was particularly striking on this point. From a realist perspective, his conclusion that the restriction on state legislators might at times limit their
freedom of speech rang true, but he was completely comfortable with suppressing that
speech because such restrictions were permissible “during the founding era.” Carrigan,
131 S. Ct. at 2355 (Alito, J., concurring). Thus, although both the Court’s opinion and
Justice Alito’s concurrence lead to the same result, Justice Alito’s concurrence is notably
frank in its sole criterion: history.
95. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States,
348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)) (noting that not only actual justice, but the “appearance of justice”
must be satisfied).
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effectively breaks the state’s promise of due process before taking life,
liberty, or property), 96 and other grounds (for example, counteracting cognitive biases in the administration of government). 97 It is important, however, to complain about this geriatric approach even
when it accidentally leads to the right results. The Court’s approach
in Carrigan is arbitrary: Had history long permitted the types of conflicts exemplified by the case, 98 it would have been made matters
worse, not better. This reasoning, moreover, is affirmatively against
continuous improvement in the law generally. 99
At least in ethics cases (and presumably in others), we seemingly
should instead view the Constitution as setting forth a timeless set of
general principles—such as “due process,” “free speech,” and “equal
protection”—to be applied in today’s cases, partly irrespective of his-

96. See, e.g., supra Parts II, IV.
97. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered Judicial Disqualification—
And a Stronger Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better Acknowledging and Adjusting to
Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual Realities, 30 REV. LITIG. 733, 740–49 (2011) (describing the effects of cognitive bias in judges).
98. In Carrigan, for example, the personal conflict involved the council member’s
three-time campaign manager, whose PR firm also gave Carrigan services at cost. According to the petition for writ of certiorari:
Vasquez was Carrigan’s campaign manager at the time of the Lazy 8 vote;
Vasquez and his company had provided services to Carrigan’s three campaigns at
cost; Carrigan considered Vasquez’s assistance ‘instrumental’ to Carrigan’s three
successful campaigns; and Carrigan, by his own admission, confided in Vasquez
‘on matters where he would not confide in his own sibling.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 10-568), 2010 WL
4278724, at *6. The campaign manager had worked on and stood to benefit further financially from the casino development, for which the council member favorably voted.
Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2347.
99. See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2826 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (using
against the state the fact that it had operated in a certain way for years; suggesting that, if
the state wanted to improve its laws nevertheless, it would have “to explain how circumstances have changed so dramatically in recent years” to justify the improvement); see also
id. (“[T]he State fails to come to grips with the fact that public disclosure of referendum
signatory information is a relatively recent practice in Washington. . . . For nearly a century, Washington's referendum process operated—and apparently operated successfully—
without the public disclosure of signatory information. The State has failed to explain how
circumstances have changed so dramatically in recent years that public disclosure is now
required.”).
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torical fetish or anecdote. 100 At a minimum, these concerns suggest
that, assuming contemporaneity can never be ignored or demoted in
constitutional interpretation, the Court should give longevity (a.k.a.
“tradition”) much less weight.
B. Convalescence: Judges as Trustees
Although Carrigan’s historical reasoning rings problematic in
both its methodology and its merit, Carrigan’s legacy might be elsewhere. That is, by taking a concept that had been applied primarily
to legislators and applying it to judges, the Court may have sparked a
new theory of recusal, or so I suggest. Answering why legislative (and
by slight extension, judicial) voting is not protected expression and
therefore fully subject to recusal law, the Court reminded us that legislators’ (and judges’) official acts are not their personal rights:
The answer is that a legislator’s vote is the commitment of
his apportioned share of the legislature’s power to the passage or defeat of a particular proposal. The legislative power
thus committed is not personal to the legislator but belongs
to the people; the legislator has no personal right to it. As
we said in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997), when
denying Article III standing to legislators who claimed that
their voting power had been diluted by a statute providing
for a line-item veto, the legislator casts his vote “as trustee for
his constituents, not as a prerogative of personal power.” In

100. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (“As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater
freedom.”); GEOFFREY R. STONE & WILLIAM P. MARSHALL, ISSUE BRIEF: THE FRAMERS’
CONSTITUTION: TOWARD A THEORY OF PRINCIPLED CONSTITUTIONALISM (Am. Constitution
Soc’y,

2011),

http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Stone_Marshall_-

_The_Framers_Constitution_Issue_Brief.pdf (arguing that the Constitution sets forth
broad principles, to which judges must give life and substance in an ever-changing society); Erwin Chemerinsky, supra note 58, at 919 (observing that both tradition and the Supreme Court formerly banned women from practicing law and noting that “surely the historical approval of such discrimination does not justify the practice today,” that “[s]ociety
is constantly changing and its moral standards are perpetually evolving,” and that “[t]he
Constitution must reflect these changes and this cannot be accomplished through a method of interpretation that is primarily based on Blackstone, English common law, and nineteenth century precedents”).
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this respect, voting by a legislator is different from voting by
a citizen. 101
The Court used only one clear criterion before applying the
above analysis: whether voting “is a core legislative function.” 102 With
respect to judges, no one would dispute that judicial voting is indeed
a “core [judicial] function.” As with a legislator, moreover, a judge’s
vote should not be personal, and like a litigant, no one should be the
judge “in his own cause.” 103 Furthermore, a judge’s personal interest
in keeping a case ranges from illegitimate to insignificant, 104 and thus
the weight of the individual judge’s interest does not counterbalance
the recusal scales. It seems, then, that judges’ votes in a case are not
their own (and are not protected by their First Amendment rights), 105
101. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2350.
102. Id. at 2347 (quoting Carrigan v. Comm’n on Ethics, 236 P.3d 616, 621 (Nev.
2010)).
103. “‘[N]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would
certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.’” Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (2009) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59
(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). For recusal law, that is true in at least two
ways: (1) various personal conflicts of interest often give the judge a personal (for example, financial) interest in the case; and (2) even without such a personal interest, the decision is still “personal” in that the judge is asked to judge her own actions and propensities
(and their appearances).
104. Indeed, the only detriment might be an illegitimate one: requiring recusal might
remove the judge from a case in which the judge could make a name for herself. See
CANONS

OF

JUDICIAL

ETHICS

Canon

34

(1924),

available

at

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/1924_canons.authch
eckdam.pdf (stating that a judge should not “administer the office for the purpose of advancing his personal ambitions or increasing his popularity”); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Chief William’s Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the Duty to Sit, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 813, 814–15
(2009) [hereinafter Stempel, Duty to Sit] (arguing that judges do not have a “duty to sit” in
cases presenting valid grounds for recusal). Although there is no tangible detriment to
the judge who denies a disqualification motion and then is reversed, it is worth noting that
judges do not like to be reversed. Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 130 (1980) (“For reasons not completely understood, judges seem to
desire to avoid being reversed.”).
105. See Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2349 & n.3 (suggesting that judicial recusal statutes do
not violate the First Amendment and distinguishing White because it dealt with campaigntrail conduct, not acts or omissions in office). Indeed, after Carrigan, it may well take the
recusal equivalent of White (that is, a case involving a judge’s failure to recuse, or disqualification, for merely “announcing” a view on a “disputed legal or political issue”) before the
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and that this fundamental point should guide the law and procedure
of judicial recusal to the extent possible. 106
But whose votes are they? The opinion identifies two potential
owners: (1) “the people;” and (2) the “constituents.” 107 These potential owners, however, do not seem well-suited to own judges’ votes.
Judges swear to uphold the law, including the Constitution and the
rule of law generally. To the extent that the law is equivalent to “the
people” in our constitutional republic, perhaps “the people” will suffice, if not a perfect match. To the extent that “the people” means
the voters or “constituents,” we need to find new ownership.
Because each litigant has a due process right to an impartial
judge, and because a lasting beauty of the judiciary is its role in protecting minorities, 108 the majority (and what is popular with the majority), or a random assortment of outspoken “constituents,” seem unfit to own the votes. 109 The Codes of Judicial Conduct have long
offered a better understanding: The judge should administer her office as a “public trust.” 110 As a trustee, the judge does not own the
First Amendment becomes a formidable question. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White,
536 U.S. 765, 784 n.12 & 785 (2002) (striking down a Minnesota rule of judicial ethics barring judicial candidates from announcing their views on “disputed legal or political issues”
because the rule failed to survive First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis); see also supra
Part I.
106. This key point that the First Amendment does not limit the regulation of “legislative action”—and according to this Essay, judicial action—was also made in Reed. Doe v.
Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2833 n.3 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (distinguishing the first case
in this trilogy, White, because it involved a prohibition against speaking on the campaign
trail).
107. Somewhat analogously, Professor Sarah Cravens identified the common law as
“(metaphorically) the property of the public,” and the public has in turn “entrusted the
care and maintenance of the corpus of the common law to the judiciary.” Sarah M.R. Cravens, Judges as Trustees: A Duty to Account and an Opportunity for Virtue, 62 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1637, 1639 (2005). “As trustees of the law,” she argued further, “judges have an obligation to uphold and maintain the corpus in individual cases in accordance with the underlying aims of the corpus.” Id. at 1639–40.
108. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828–29 (1997) (noting that the value of judicial review stems from the protection it affords to individuals and minority groups); see also
supra note 80.
109. If, again, we can safely substitute “the people” for the law, or arguably even justice,
this new conceptualization might lead to a better understanding of recusal law.
110. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Pmbl. (2004) (“Intrinsic to all sections of this
Code are the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor
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corpus. 111 Without even identifying the precise owner of judicial
votes—whether past, present, or future litigants, the political subdivision, the people, or justice—we can determine that judges neither own
their votes nor have rights to cast conflicted votes. 112
For whatever reason, many judges are lax in recusing themselves,
and many other judges are lax in later disqualifying those judges who
failed to recuse themselves. 113 Perhaps explaining ownership—and
emphasizing that judges clearly do not own votes—might resonate
better with judges, and the concept takes one more step toward mak-

the judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in our
legal system.”) (emphasis added); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Pmbl. (2007) (substantially the same); cf. James J. Sample, Lawyer, Candidate, Beneficiary, AND Judge? Role Differentiation in Elected Judiciaries, 51 JUDGES’ J. 30, 33–34 (2012) (referring astutely to judges
as “fiduciaries of the rule of law”).
111. Of course, trustees are indeed authorized to make decisions affecting the corpus,
but that bare fact misses the conceptual point (and ignores conflicts rules). Trustees’ personal interests, moreover, are not a legitimate factor in those decisions.
112. Cf. Menachem Mautner, Moral And Legal Luck: Luck in the Courts, 9 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 217, 231 (2008) (noting that “the duty incumbent on judges to abide by the
norm of impartiality might be viewed as an expression of the approach that sees the judge
as a trustee of the litigating parties”). Judges, under this conception, must not be distracted from this trusteeship by other influences, including “personal” ones. Id. Arguably,
then, their personal interests would include (among others) (1) their interest in assessing
their own impartiality, or the appearance of it, and (2) any personal interest in keeping
the case, despite a pending motion to disqualify or ground for recusal. Judges whose impartiality is in question are not the proper judges to decide that question.
113. See, e.g., Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges, supra note 31, at 370–72 (discussing
some of the various studies and reasons showing that judges are not accurate judges of
their own disqualification questions). In addition to the studies and reasons listed in the
previously cited work, one vivid example can be found in United States v. Holland, holding
that the trial judge permissibly presided over the sentencing of a defendant who had
called the judge’s home and threatened him. 519 F.3d 909, 916 (9th Cir. 2008). The
court was apparently worried about judge shopping through defendants’ hollow threats.
Id. at 915. Yet the court missed several points: (1) that the judge would likely be at least
angry that the defendant called the judge’s house making improper remarks (even if the
judge was not scared about threats); (2) that each time a defendant threatens a public official, he commits a serious felony, the fear of which would deter most defendants from
making hollow threats merely to judge shop; and (3) the defendant had not previously
threatened this or another federal judge (and thus disqualifying the trial judge would not
necessarily lead to more threats and more disqualifications).
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ing the matter less personal to them. 114 Moreover, although recusal
law has historically been plagued (and mocked) because the same
judge whose impartiality is being questioned also decides whether her
impartiality could be questioned, this new conception might beckon
an end to this legal joke. Under the conception, as a non-owner, the
affected judge simply does not have standing to challenge a disqualification motion. 115 This cleansing perhaps could even be extended to
other instances in which individual judges are named in and potentially defend actions in their “official” capacity; 116 this often erroneous
conflation of the individual and the official should stop. Similarly, in
drafting and enforcing recusal law, drafters and regulators might be
better guided and energized now that they have a clearer picture of
the rightful “owner”—or at least the “non-owner.”
Finally, this clarified conception exposes the lurking error in
Kennedy’s concurrence, which implied strong “associational rights”
for elective officials to bond with campaign supporters and rule on

114. Indeed, one of the advantages of an appearance-based disqualification standard is
that it does not require the judge, or the judges’ colleagues, to declare that the judge is
actually biased—something that they would be reluctant to do—only that the circumstances create an untoward appearance.
115. Judges have no individual stake in—and suffer no cognizable harm from the loss
of—their votes. Cf., e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997) (concluding the same for
legislators’ votes); Stempel, Duty to Sit, supra note 104, at 814–15 (concluding that judges
have no duty to sit). Any “claim of standing is based on a loss of political power, not loss of
any private right.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 821. “The claimed injury thus runs (in a sense) with
the Member’s seat, a seat which the Member holds (it may quite arguably be said) as trustee for his constituents, not as a prerogative of personal power.” Id. Thus, judges individually bring with them no interest to counterbalance the movant’s interest in disqualification. The focus then should shift to any interest they hold in their trustee capacity (for
example, the fair administration of justice). In light of their personally questioned impartiality, however, these judges are not the best trustees to identify and effectuate the trust’s
best interests; other judges should instead decide whether disqualification is appropriate.
116. See, e.g., Gowan v. Keller, No. 11-50874, at 3 (5th Cir. filed May 30, 2012),
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions%5Cunpub%5C11/11-50874.0.wpd.pdf (construing
a complaint against Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Justice Sharon Keller as a mandamus
action); Derendal v. Griffith, 104 P.3d 147, 149 (Ariz. 2005) (appealing Phoenix Municipal
Judge Griffith’s ruling); Costa v. Mackey, 261 P.3d 449, 455 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (defending the trial judge’s decision, including a decision refusing to disqualify the previous trial
judge).
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“common cause[s].” 117 Our public officials (or a minimum the subset
of judges) may well have personal “associational” rights, but they
should have no right to import those “associational rights” into the
duties of public office. The public office stands pure in its public
purpose—from which no judge’s personal needs or wants should detract. Indeed, a judge whose “associational rights” might affect the
proceeding in any significant way should not attempt to remain in the
case; to the contrary, the judge should step aside so that another
judge without individual baggage can better discharge the public
purpose. A judge who instead rationalizes or appeals to stay in the
case necessarily seeks to commingle the public purpose with personal
purpose.
In sum, the conceptual shift is incremental, and it will not answer
all questions. But it is fundamental: Judges administering the public
office as trustees have no recognized personal interest—and no standing to attempt to assert personal interest.
V. CODA
The Carrigan and Caperton Courts wisely (if somewhat inadvertently) closed the opening in White, which had constitutionally jeopardized and practically deterred recusal law. 118 After nearly a decade
of living in significant fear and under considerable uncertainty, judicial ethics regulators in the post-Carrigan world should finally be able

117. Justice Kennedy was worried about the “burdens [that recusal laws might] impose
on the First Amendment speech rights of legislators and constituents apart from an asserted right to engage in the act of casting a vote.” Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2352 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). In particular, he thought even close friendships and other associations, including campaign supporters, should not necessarily disqualify legislators from their
“common cause[s] now at stake.” Id. at 2353. To be sure, Kennedy himself arguably excluded judges from this analysis. See id. (noting that the role of legislative bodies might
not apply to “principles of judicial impartiality” and the “role of courts in adjudicating individual disputes”). But to speak generally about First Amendment rights of judges “apart
from” their vote is a faulty premise. Judges—as members of the judiciary—should have no
such rights. On the campaign trail and off the bench, for instance, individual candidates
and incumbents have measured First Amendment rights. See supra Part I and accompanying notes. Carrigan, however, helped to show that the First Amendment no longer applies
on the bench. See supra Part III. Of course, judicial speech necessary to carry out the public office cannot and should not be silenced, but that has nothing to do with the underlying personal rights of the individual judge.
118. See supra Parts I–III.
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to enforce recusal rules to their intended extent. To be sure, a few
dangerous First Amendment openings still exist, including whether
(and if so, which particular) recusal rules violate the associational
rights of elective judges. 119 Moreover, the Court’s use of history is
dangerous in general and doubly dangerous for ethics in particular. 120
Although history can contain useful observations for both judicial and
moral interpretations, the Court has created a constitutional “stop
loss” policy by which outdated practices are continually forced to
maintain active duty; notwithstanding the drastically changed circumstances, these tired practices now constitute and constrain our constitutional order. 121
But Carrigan and Caperton have also created other promising new
openings—including the conceptual act of removing voting power
from the list of judges’ personal rights—which present possibilities to
122
reconcile, unify, and grow recusal law.

119. See Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2353–54 (2011) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (implying strong associational rights for elective officials to bond with
campaign supporters and rule on “common cause[s]”). The Court also did not address
the vagueness or overbreadth challenges, but presumably between the strongly supportive
language of the Court’s opinion and Justice Kennedy’s distinction between the judicial
and legislative contexts, there is little to fear. See id. at 2353 (distinguishing between judicial and legislative situations).
120. See supra Part IV.A.
121. See supra Part IV.A.
122. See supra Part IV.B.

